Defamation Law in Ireland | Definitive Guide from Lawyer.ie
  If
 you wish to get advice from a solicitor regarding a possible defamation
 case, you can contact Roddy Tyrrell at 01-6671476 or submit this quick contact form.
If
 you wish to get advice from a solicitor regarding a possible defamation
 case, you can contact Roddy Tyrrell at 01-6671476 or submit this quick contact form.
 
 (Update: Since this article was written in 2009, there have
 been some changes to the law including the reduction in the Statute of 
Limitations period from six years to one year. An update by barrister 
Karl Sweeney is available on our website here).
 Copyright of Kieron Wood. This article may not be 
distributed or copied without the author's consent. Feel free however to
 share with friends and colleagues using the social media sharing 
buttons on the right.
 Defamation
 is one of the most serious dangers facing journalists and publishers 
today. Eighty per cent of all defamation actions are brought against the
 media - and a libel action can bankrupt a small newspaper or radio 
station.
Defamation
 is one of the most serious dangers facing journalists and publishers 
today. Eighty per cent of all defamation actions are brought against the
 media - and a libel action can bankrupt a small newspaper or radio 
station.
 Balance of rights
Journalists may feel that they should have the right to say
 whatever they like. After all, Article 40.6.1.i of the Irish 
Constitution says that the State guarantees the right of citizens to 
express freely their convictions and opinions. But the right of freedom 
of expression in Ireland is not absolute.
 
 The Article goes on to say that, because of the importance of educating
 public opinion, the State will try to ensure that the organs of public 
opinion such as the radio and the press (it doesn't mention television 
or the internet) keep their right to liberty of expression, but they 
shall not be used to undermine public order, morality or the authority 
of the State.
 
 The right of freedom of speech is also guaranteed by Article 10 (1) of 
the European Human Rights Convention, which provides that: "Everyone has
 the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to
 hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas, without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers."
 
 But Article 10 (2) subjects this freedom to such restrictions "as are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
 territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of 
the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary".
 
 Of course, the Irish Constitution does not only guarantee freedom to 
the media. It also guarantees to respect the personal rights of 
citizens. Article 40.3.2 of the Constitution says "the State shall, in 
particular, by its laws, protect as best it may from unjust attack (and,
 in the case of injustice done, vindicate) the life, person, good name 
and property rights of every citizen."
 
 In the 1988 case of 
Kennedy v Hearne, the Irish High Court 
specifically acknowledged the role played by the law of defamation in 
vindicating a citizen's right to his good name.
 What is defamation?
 The law of defamation in Ireland is governed by the Constitution, common law and the Defamation Act 2009.
 That Act repeals the Defamation Act 1961, which was in force until the 
first day of 2010. The Defamation Act 2009 now governs all claims of 
defamation arising since the commencement of the new legislation.
The law of defamation in Ireland is governed by the Constitution, common law and the Defamation Act 2009.
 That Act repeals the Defamation Act 1961, which was in force until the 
first day of 2010. The Defamation Act 2009 now governs all claims of 
defamation arising since the commencement of the new legislation.
 
 The traditional definition of defamation was publication of a false 
statement which subjected a person to hatred, ridicule or contempt. That
 rather archaic definition has given way to a more modern one: according
 to the Defamation Act 2009, a defamatory statement is one which tends 
to injure a person’s reputation in the eyes of reasonable members of 
society. (That means that a person cannot sue for having his reputation 
lowered in the eyes of, for example, other members of his criminal 
gang!)
 
 Defamation has traditionally been divided into two forms: libel and 
slander. Historically, libel was the written form of defamation, while 
slander was the spoken form. The advent of modern technology has made 
those definitions obsolete. Even though broadcasting is, in one way, a 
more transient medium than newspapers, the invention of tape and video 
recorders and the internet means that a false statement can now be 
preserved in the same way as a newspaper cutting. So today, a defamatory
 statement broadcast on radio or television or the internet would be 
regarded as libellous, rather than slanderous. The 2009 act abolishes 
the separate torts of libel and slander and replaces them with the “tort
 of defamation”.
 
 An actionable defamatory statement has three ingredients:
- 
  it must be published,
- 
  it must refer to the complainant and
- 
  it must be false.
 Publication
A defamatory statement is only actionable if it is published. In the 1840 case of Ahern v Maguire,
 Chief Baron Brady said that, if a letter "however slanderous, is 
received only by the person to whom it is addressed, and does not go 
beyond him, there is no publication of it in law to support an action 
for libel". (But a wrongly addressed letter containing defamatory 
remarks would be actionable if opened by someone other than the subject 
of the remarks.)
 
 A person who is aware that a libellous report is about to be published 
may apply to the courts for an injunction to prevent publication. But in
 the case of 
National Irish Bank v Radio Telefis Eireann [1998] 2 IR 465,
 the Supreme Court said that, if the publisher made out a strong case 
for publication on a public interest basis, the court, in its 
discretion, should not grant the injunction, but leave the applicant to 
seek a remedy in damages.However, in 1998 the High Court granted an 
interlocutory injunction to nightclub owner John Reynolds to prevent 
former solicitor Elio Malocco publishing what Reynolds claimed would be a
 disparaging article about the club owner in a new magazine, Patrick 
[1998] IEHC 175.
 Mr Justice Kelly said this was "a jurisdiction of a delicate nature" 
and "the Court must be circumspect to ensure that it does not 
unnecessarily interfere with the right of freedom of expression". He 
said he would not set out "hard and fast manner" the factors which the 
Court could take into account in the exercise of this discretion, but to
 refuse an injunction "would be to consign the plaintiff to a trial 
where damages would be an inadequate remedy because of the virtual 
impossibility of ever recovering any sum awarded".
 
 In order to prove publication, it is only necessary to show that one 
person received the communication and that his opinion of the subject 
was lowered as a result. A jury may, however, take into account the 
extent of publication when considering damages, including the extent of 
internet publication.
 Identification
A defamatory statement need not necessarily name anyone. It
 may suggest a person or persons by - for example - their profession, 
location or connections. A former garda commissioner was awarded £30,000
 damages for the use of a graphic which featured his ears in a 
television programme on corruption! And a senior barrister settled a 
High Court action against Irish television for an undisclosed amount for
 using a graphic of her car in a story about drunk drivers.
 
 If just one person gives credible evidence that he recognised the 
complainant by the description or image, that is enough to ground a 
defamation action.
 
 Only a false statement is actionable. But defamation differs from other
 torts in that a statement will be presumed to be defamatory until 
proved otherwise. If a defendant wishes to plead justification as a 
defence, he has to prove the truth of the statement. No matter how old 
the allegation or how obscure or how intrusive of a person's privacy, a 
complainant is not entitled to bring an defamation action in relation to
 publication of a true statement.
 
 A false report which is published maliciously is likely to attract 
higher damages than an erroneous report published innocently - but 
damages for errors can still be high enough to put media organisations 
out of business.
 Privilege
If a statement is privileged, a potential plaintiff has no 
cause of action. There are two types of privilege: absolute privilege 
and qualified privilege. In the case of absolute privilege, the 
intentions of the publisher are irrelevant.
 
 For example, a Dáil deputy or member of the Seanad may say what he 
wishes about a person within the confines of the chamber. No matter how 
scurrilous the allegation or how improper the motive for making it, he 
may not be sued for that statement. Similarly in a court of law, a judge
 may not be sued for anything he may say, and a barrister may make 
whatever allegations he pleases while on his feet, without fear of an 
action for defamation. (A lawyer who makes irrelevant, insulting and 
provocative statements may be guilty of contempt of court, but that is a
 different matter!)
 
 A fair, accurate and contemporaneous media report of Oireachtas or 
court proceedings is also absolutely privileged, even if the reporter is
 motivated by malice. Clearly this exception is aimed at allowing free 
speech for members of the judicial and legislative arms of government, 
and for accurate reports of their views.
 
 Qualified privilege attaches to communications where the informant has a
 legal, moral or social duty to communicate the information and the 
recipient has a similar duty to receive it. For example, a person may 
write to an employer making allegations of dishonesty or incompetence 
against an employee. If the allegations are made in good faith, even if 
they are factually wrong, the communication is not actionable. This 
privilege is defeated by proof of malice.
 
 The Defamation Act also provides qualified privilege for reports of the
 proceedings of certain foreign organisations (such as the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities), copies of entries in public 
registers and notices, without the necessity to correct or explain such 
reports.
 
 Qualified privilege is also granted for reports of certain public 
meetings, organisations and bodies (such as local authorities and 
tribunals) "subject to explanation or contradiction". In these cases, 
the publisher will lose the privilege if he fails to amend or clarify an
 erroneous statement.
 
 Occasionally an apology published by a media organisation may reflect 
adversely on the skill and ability of the journalist who wrote or 
broadcast the article in question. In the 1938 case of 
Willis v Irish Press,
 a journalist sued his employer for publishing what he claimed was an 
unwarranted apology. The Supreme Court ruled that publication of the 
apology was privileged, as it was a matter of self-defence for the 
newspaper. The rationale of that decision, coming at about the time of 
the introduction of the Constitution, might well be considered dubious 
today.
 Damages
 Damages
 in a defamation case may be high enough to put a media organisation out
 of business - even before considering the matter of legal costs. 
Because of the high risk of defending a defamation action, the 
unpredictability of juries and the heavy legal costs of a hearing, the 
majority of libel cases have traditionally been settled before coming to
 court.
Damages
 in a defamation case may be high enough to put a media organisation out
 of business - even before considering the matter of legal costs. 
Because of the high risk of defending a defamation action, the 
unpredictability of juries and the heavy legal costs of a hearing, the 
majority of libel cases have traditionally been settled before coming to
 court.
 
 A defendant who loses a defamation action is likely to have to meet the
 legal bill of both sides. He may limit his exposure to costs by lodging
 money in court in an offer of settlement.
 
 A publisher who denies liability must take the risk of losing a case 
after it has been running in court for some days - or even weeks - with 
the attendant enormous legal bill. The highest award ever given by an 
Irish court in defamation was €10 million in November 2010. The award 
was made to businessman Donal Kinsella, who sued his former employer, 
Kenmare Resources, over a press release it sent out concerning an 
incident where he had sleep-walked into a woman’s bedroom while on 
company business in Africa. The jury awarded €9 million in compensatory 
damages and €1 million in aggravated damages. Prior to the Kinsella 
case, the highest libel award was €1.9 million in damages awarded to Mrs
 Monica Leech over a series of articles in the Evening Herald newspaper 
in 2004 which falsely suggested that she had had an affair with a 
government minister.
 
If a publisher pleads justification (that an alleged fact 
is substantially true) and this turns out not to be the case, the jury 
may award aggravated damages as a punishment for the additional harm 
done to the complainant's reputation. For example, when Elton John sued 
the Sunday Mirror in 1993, he was awarded £75,000 in ordinary damages, 
but almost four times that amount in punitive damages. (This was reduced
 to a total of £75,000 on appeal.)
 
 If a jury finds that a complainant has been libelled, juries have 
traditionally awarded at least nominal damages. Traditionally, this was a
 farthing. In the 1955 case of 
Campbellv Irish Press, 
concerning a review of a snooker exhibition which claimed "the table 
told lies", the jury awarded no damages, but the Supreme Court 
substituted an award of £1. In the action taken by the former Irish 
Taoiseach (prime minister) Albert Reynolds against the Sunday Times, it 
was just one penny. And in the April 2001 case of Irish parliamentarian 
Beverley Cooper-Flynn against state broadcaster RTE, the jury found that
 RTE had not proved its case, but other evidence showed that the 
plaintiff's character had not been damaged. She was awarded no damages 
and ordered to pay a legal bill estimated at £2 million.
 
 Since the establishment of the Press Ombudsman and the Press Council of
 Ireland in 2007, anyone who believes he or she has been defamed may 
complain to the Press Ombudsman. If the ombudsman finds in their favour,
 he may instruct the media organisation to publish an appropriate 
apology or correction. The Press Council was set up following the 2003 
report of the government's legal advisory group on defamation, which 
also recommended reform of the 1961 Defamation Act.
 
 The 2009 act comprises 44 sections, including a definition of 
defamation, defences, remedies and the establishment of criminal 
liability for blasphemy. In the time-honoured draftsmen’s tradition of 
never using a single word where a clause (or two, or three) will do, the
 legislation is extraordinarily complicated in places. This is a 
somewhat simpler version:
 
 The limitation period for defamation actions is reduced from six years 
to one year from the date of first publication. The period can be 
extended to up to two years by court order, but the court will not 
extend the period unless an extension is required in the interests of 
justice and the prejudice suffered by the plaintiff would significantly 
outweigh the prejudice to the defendant. When deciding whether to extend
 time, the court will consider the reason for the failure to bring the 
action in time and the extent to which the delay means that relevant 
evidence is no longer available.
 
 A statement may be made orally or in writing, broadcast on radio or 
television or published on the internet, and includes electronic 
communications and visual images, sounds, gestures and any other method 
of signifying meaning.
 
 The “tort of defamation” consists of the publication, by any means, of a
 defamatory statement about somebody to one or more person. A statement 
is not considered defamatory if it is published only to the person to 
whom it relates. It is also not defamatory if published to another 
person, as long as:
- 
  the publisher did not intend to publish the statement to the other person, and
- 
  it was not reasonably foreseeable that publication to the first person would result in publication to the other person.
Proof of special damage – or actual loss – is not required 
except actions for slander of title, slander of goods or malicious 
falsehood. In such cases, the plaintiff has to prove special damage or 
that publication of the statement was calculated to cause (and likely to
 cause) financial loss in respect of his property or office, profession,
 calling, trade or business.
 
 The plaintiff must also prove that the statement was untrue, was 
published maliciously and referred to the plaintiff, his property or 
office, profession, calling, trade or business.
 
 Where the plaintiff or defendant is making an allegation of fact, he 
must swear an affidavit verifying the allegations within two months of 
service of the pleadings. The maximum penalty for swearing a false or 
misleading affidavit is a fine of €50,000 and five years’ imprisonment.
 
 Even if a statement contains several false allegations, a plaintiff 
will have only one cause of action. Similarly, if the same defamatory 
statement is made to several people, there is only one cause of action, 
unless the court decides otherwise.
 
 If a defamatory statement is published about a group of people, any 
member of that group has a cause of action if the statement could 
reasonably be understood to refer to that person, either because of the 
number of people in the group or the circumstances in which the 
statement is published.
 
 The new act applies to companies as well as individuals, and a company 
may bring a defamation action whether or not it has incurred any 
financial loss as a result.
 
 The problem of excessive jury awards of damages being awarded by High 
Court juries is tackled by the provision in section 13 that, on appeal, 
the Supreme Court may substitute an “appropriate amount for any High 
Court jury award.
 
 If asked, a judge may decide – in the absence of the jury – whether a 
statement is “reasonably capable” of having the suggested imputation, 
and whether that imputation is reasonably capable of having a defamatory
 meaning.
 
 If the court rules that a statement is not reasonably capable of having
 the suggested imputation or being defamatory, it must dismiss that part
 of the action.
 Defences
 All earlier defences are abolished by the new act, except certain statutory defences. The main defence is now the defence of truth,
 where a defendant proves that his statement is true in all material 
respects. This defence may still be used, even if the truth of every 
allegation is not proved, as long as the unproven words do not 
materially injure the plaintiff’s reputation in the light of the 
remaining true allegations.
 
 The existing 
defence of absolute privilege is retained and extended to include any:
 
 (a) statement made in either House of the Oireachtas by a TD or Senator,
 (b) report of a statement by a TD or Senator produced by authority of either House,
 (c) statement made in the European Parliament by an MEP,
 (d) report of a statement by an MEP produced by authority of the European Parliament,
 (e) statement made in a court judgment,
 (f) statement made by a person performing a judicial function,
 (g) statement made by a party, witness, lawyer or juror during judicial proceedings,
 (h) statement made during and connected with proceedings involving 
limited functions of a judicial nature (such as the Employment Appeals 
Tribunal),
 (i) fair and accurate report of public proceedings or a decision of any court in the Republic or Northern Ireland,
 (j) fair and accurate report of certain family law proceedings,
 (k) fair and accurate report of proceedings of courts including the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, the Court of First Instance of 
the European Union, the European Court of Human Rights and the 
International Court of Justice,
 (l) statement made in proceedings before a committee appointed by either or both Houses of the Oireachtas,
 (m) statement made in proceedings before a committee of the European Parliament,
 (n) statement made during and connected with proceedings before a Tribunal of Inquiry,
 (o) statement in a tribunal report,
 (p) statement made during and connected with proceedings before a commission of investigation,
 (q) statement in a commission report,
 (r) statement made during a coroner’s inquest or in a decision or verdict at an inquest,
 (s) statement made during an inquiry conducted by authority of the government, a minister, the Dáil or Seanad or a court,
 (t) statement made during an inquiry in Northern Ireland on the 
authority of the British government, Northern assembly, minister or 
court,
 (u) statement in a report of such inquiries,
 (v) statement made during and connected with proceedings before an arbitral tribunal, or
 (w) statement made in accordance with a court order in the Republic of Ireland.
 
 
Qualified privilege may be pleaded as a defence where a
 statement was published to a person who had a legal, moral or social 
duty to receive the information, or where the defendant reasonably 
believed that the person had such a duty or interest, and the defendant 
had a corresponding duty to communicate the information.
 
 It is a defence for a defendant to prove that the statement Is covered 
by Part 1 of Schedule 1 or is in a report or decision referred to. It is
 also a defence to prove that a statement is in a report referred to in 
Part 2 of Schedule 1, unless the plaintiff can prove that he asked the 
defendant to publish a reasonable statement of explanation or 
contradiction, and the defendant failed to do so, or did so in an 
inadequate or unreasonable way.
 
 These privileges do not protect publication of any statement prohibited
 by law, or statements that are not of public concern and not published 
for the public benefit.
 
 The defence of qualified privilege fails if the plaintiff proves 
malice. However, the defence will not fail just because the statement 
was published to someone else by mistake.
 
 Where a defence of qualified privilege fails in the case of one 
defendant, another defendant may still plead that defence unless he was 
vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of the first defendant 
which led to the publication.
 
 The 
“honest opinion” defence is available for honestly-held opinions as long as—
- 
  at the time of publication, the defendant believed in the 
truth of the opinion (or thought that its author believed it to be 
true),
- 
  the opinion was based on proven (or honestly believed) 
allegations of fact that were known to those to whom the statement was 
published, or
- 
  the opinion was based on proven (or reasonably likely) 
allegations of fact which were privileged and the opinion related to a 
matter of public interest.
Where a defamatory opinion is published jointly by more 
than one person, the defence of honest opinion is available to a 
defendant who does not honestly believe it, unless he was vicariously 
liable for the acts or omissions of the joint publisher at the time of 
publication. To distinguish between allegations of fact and opinion, a 
court will consider:
- 
  the extent to which the statement is capable of being proved;
- 
  whether the statement was likely to have been reasonably understood as an opinion, rather than a fact; and
- 
  the words used and the extent of any qualification, disclaimer or caution.
A person accused of defamation may make an offer of amends. Such an offer must be in writing and state:
- 
  that it is an offer to make amends under section 22, and
- 
  whether it relates to the entire statement, part of it or a particular defamatory meaning only.
An offer to make amends cannot be made after the defence 
has been delivered. However, an offer may be withdrawn before it is 
accepted and a new offer made. An “offer to make amends” means an offer—
- 
  to make a suitable correction and sufficient apology,
- 
  to publish the correction and apology in a “reasonable and practicable” manner, and
- 
  to pay agreed compensation, damages and costs.
If an offer to make amends is accepted and the parties 
agree on the implementation of the offer, the court may direct the 
defendant to take those measures. If the parties do not agree, the 
person who made the offer may make a correction and apology in a 
statement before the court in terms approved by the court and give an 
undertaking about the manner of publication. If the parties cannot agree
 on damages or costs, the court will decide the matter, taking into 
account the adequacy of any steps already taken to comply with the 
offer.
 
 Once an offer to make amends is accepted, no defamation action can be 
brought in respect of the original statement unless the court considers 
that it is just and proper to so do. It is a defence to a defamation 
action to prove that an offer to make amends was not accepted, unless 
the plaintiff proves that the defendant knew when the original statement
 was published that it referred to the plaintiff and was false and 
defamatory. If a qualified offer of amends is not accepted, the defence 
applies only to that part of the statement.
 
 A person who offers to make amends does not have to plead it as a 
defence. If a defendant does plead this defence , he cannot plead any 
other defence. If the defence is pleaded in respect of a qualified offer
 only, no other defence may be pleaded in respect of that part of the 
statement.
 
 A defendant may give evidence in mitigation of damages that he—
- 
  made (or offered) an apology and
- 
  published (or offered to publish) the apology with similar
 prominence to the original statement as soon as practicable after the 
complaint or the bringing of the action, whichever was earlier.
A defendant who intends to give such evidence must notify the plaintiff in writing in advance.
 
 One important change in the new act is that 
an apology no longer constitutes an express or implied admission of liability
 and is not relevant to the issue of liability. Evidence of such an 
apology is not admissible in any civil proceedings as evidence of 
liability.
 
 The 
defence of consent may be pleaded where a plaintiff consented to publication of the impugned statement.
 
 The 
defence of fair and reasonable publication on a matter of public interest may be pleaded where a defendant can prove that a statement was published—
- 
  in good faith and
- 
  during (or for the purpose of) discussion of a subject of public interest for the public benefit.
The manner and extent of publication must not exceed what 
is reasonably sufficient, and it must be fair and reasonable to publish 
the statement.
 
 In deciding whether publication was “fair and reasonable”, the court can take into account any relevant matter, including:
 
 (a) the extent to which the statement refers to the performance of public functions;
 (b) the seriousness of any allegations;
 (c) the context and content (including the language) of the statement;
 (d) the extent to which the statement distinguished between suspicions, allegations and facts;
 (e) the extent to which exceptional circumstances required publication of the statement at that time;
 (f) where the publisher was a member of the Press Council, the extent 
to which the person adhered to the council’s code of standards and the 
decisions of the Press Ombudsman and Council (or (g) equivalent 
standards, where the publisher was not a member of the Press Council).
 (h) the extent and prominence of the plaintiff’s version of events or
 (i) attempts made by the publisher made to obtain and publish a response; and
 (j) any attempts made to verify the allegations.
 
 Where a plaintiff failed or refused to respond to the defendant’s 
attempts to establish his version of events, this does not imply consent
 to publication or entitle the court to draw any inference.
 
 A statement issued by the Department of Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform on 23 April 2010 said: "Subscription to the Press Council and 
adherence to the Code of Practice for newspapers and periodicals will 
strengthen the entitlement to avail of the new defence of reasonable 
publication in any court action. Non-members of the Press Council will 
be required to have in place an equivalent fairness regime or to operate
 an equivalent and publicised code of standards to avail of that 
defence."
 
 The 
defence of innocent publication may be pleaded where the defendant can prove that—
- 
  he was not the author, editor or publisher of the statement,
- 
  he took reasonable care in relation to its publication and
- 
  he did not know, and had no reason to believe, that his actions would lead to defamation proceedings.
A person is not considered the author, editor or publisher 
of a statement if he was responsible only for the printing, production, 
distribution or selling of printed material, or the processing, copying,
 distribution, exhibition or sale of a film or sound recording or 
electronic recording or storage, or the playback or distribution 
equipment.
 
 In deciding whether a person took reasonable care about his actions, the court will consider—
- 
  the extent of that person’s responsibility for the content of the statement or the decision to publish it,
- 
  the nature or circumstances of the publication, and
- 
  the person’s previous conduct or character.
 Remedies
 A person who claims to be the subject of an alleged defamatory a statement may apply to the Circuit Court for a declaratory order that the statement is false and defamatory. The court will make a declaratory order if it is satisfied that—
- 
  the statement is defamatory of the applicant and the respondent has no defence,
- 
  the applicant requested the respondent to publish an apology, correction or retraction of the statement, and
- 
  the respondent failed to do so or did not give the 
apology, correction or retraction similar prominence to the original 
statement.
An applicant for a declaratory order does not have to prove
 that a statement is false. Anyone who applies for a declaratory order 
cannot bring any other proceedings arising out of the statement to which
 the application relates.
 
 A court which makes a declaratory order may also make a 
correction order and an 
order prohibiting publication
 of the statement, but it cannot award damages. The court can give 
directions about the delivery of pleadings and the time and manner of 
trial of any issues in order to come to a speedy decision.
 
 A defendant may give the plaintiff written notice that he is paying an 
amount into court in satisfaction of the action, without admission of 
liability. The plaintiff may accept the payment in full settlement of 
the action.
 
 Where a court finds that a statement was defamatory and the defendant 
has no defence, the plaintiff may ask for a correction order. The order 
specifies when the correction must be published, and the form, content, 
extent and manner of publication. Unless the plaintiff requests 
otherwise, the correction must be published in a way that will ensure 
that it is communicated to all (or substantially all) of the people to 
whom the defamatory statement was published. A plaintiff who intends to 
apply for a correction order must inform the defendant in writing at 
least seven days before the trial, and must inform the court at the 
trial. An application may be made at any time the court directs.
 
The parties in a defamation action may make submissions to 
the court about damages. In the High Court, the judge must give the jury
 directions about damages, taking into account:
 
 (a) the nature and gravity of the original allegation,
 (b) the means of publication, including their possible lasting nature,
 (c) the extent of circulation of the defamatory statement,
 (d) the offer of any apology, correction or retraction,
 (e) any offer to make amends by the defendant, whether or not that was pleaded as a defence,
 (f) the importance of the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of some or all recipients of the defamatory statement,
 (g) the extent to which the plaintiff contributed to or acquiesced in the publication,
 (h) the plaintiff’s reputation,
 (i) the extent to which the defence of truth is successfully pleaded if
 the defendant proves the truth of only part of the statement,
 (j) the extent to which the defendant has agreed to the plaintiff’s 
request to publish a reasonable statement of explanation or 
contradiction if the defence of qualified privilege is pleaded, and
 (k) any order prohibiting publication, or any correction order that may be made.
 
 Where an apparently innocent statement is defamatory due to facts known
 to only some recipients, it will be treated as having been published to
 those people only.
 
 With the court’s permission, the defendant may give evidence of any 
matter which has a bearing on the reputation of the plaintiff, provided 
that it relates to matters connected with the defamatory statement. The 
defendant may also point out if the plaintiff has been awarded damages 
for substantially the same allegations in another action.
 
 The court may award 
special damages for any financial 
loss suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the injury to his 
reputation. Where a defendant is liable to pay damages and the conduct 
of his defence aggravated the injury to the plaintiff’s reputation, the 
court may order the payment of 
aggravated damages. 
Where it is proved that the defendant intended to publish the defamatory
 statement to someone else knowing that it would be understood to refer 
to the plaintiff, and knew that the statement was untrue (or was 
reckless as to whether it was true or not), the court may also award
punitive damages.
 
 The plaintiff may ask the judge to prohibit further publication of a 
defamatory statement where the defendant has no defence that is 
reasonably likely to succeed. The judge cannot prohibit journalists from
 reporting his order, as long as the reports do not include the 
statement to which the order relates.
 
 A plaintiff may be awarded summary relief if the judge is satisfied 
that a statement is defamatory, and the defendant has no defence that is
 reasonably likely to succeed. A defendant can ask a judge to dismiss an
 action if he is satisfied that the statement is not reasonably capable 
of having a defamatory meaning.
 
 The 2009 act also abolishes the common law offences of defamatory libel, seditious libel and obscene libel.
 Blasphemy
 Anyone who publishes or utters blasphemous matter shall be 
guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of up to €25,000. Blasphemous 
matter is material that is “grossly abusive or insulting” about beliefs 
held sacred by any religion, and which causes “outrage among a 
substantial number of the adherents of that religion”, where the 
defendant intends to cause such outrage.
 
 It is a defence to prove that a reasonable person would find “genuine 
literary, artistic, political, scientific, or academic value in the 
matter to which the offence relates”.
 
 “Religion” does not include an organisation whose principal object is 
making a profit, or an organisation that employs “oppressive 
psychological manipulation” of its followers, or to gain new followers.
 
 The court may issue a warrant to gardai to enter any premises 
(including a home), by force if necessary, at a “reasonable” time, where
 gardai have reasonable grounds for believing that copies of a 
blasphemous statement may be found. The gardai may search the premises 
and seize and remove all copies of the statement found, and may seize 
all copies of the statement in anyone’s possession.
 Survival of action
 Formerly, if a plaintiff died, the action died with him. 
But under the 2009 act, if a plaintiff dies, the defamation action 
survives and special damages may be sought, though damages recoverable 
for the benefit of his estate may not include general, punitive or 
aggravated damages.
 
 An agreement to indemnify any person against civil liability for 
defamation in respect of the publication of any statement shall be 
lawful unless at the time of the publication that person knows that the 
statement is defamatory, and does not reasonably believe that there is a
 defence to any action brought upon it that would succeed.
 Jurisdiction
 Section 41 extends the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in defamation actions from €38,000 to €50,000.
 
 Where a person has been convicted or acquitted of an offence in the 
state, the fact of the conviction or acquittal, and any findings of fact
 made during the proceedings for the offence are admissible in a 
defamation action.
 Press Council and Press Ombudsman
 The act also set up a Press Council and Press Ombudsman to
- 
  ensure the protection of freedom of expression of the press,
- 
  protect the public interest by ensuring ethical, accurate and truthful reporting by the press,
- 
  maintain minimum ethical and professional standards among the press and
- 
  ensure that people's privacy and dignity is protected.
The ministerial order giving formal statutory recognition 
to the Press Council of Ireland as the "Press Council" was signed on 
April 23 2010.
 Statements having qualified privilege
 Schedule 1 Part 1 - Statements privileged without explanation or contradiction
1. A fair and accurate report of any matter to 
which the defence of absolute privilege would apply (other than a fair 
and accurate report referred to in section 17(2)(i) or (k)).
 2. A fair and accurate report of any court-martial proceedings
 3. A fair and accurate report of proceedings (other than court 
proceedings) presided over by a judge of a court established under the 
law of Northern Ireland.
 4. A fair and accurate report of any public proceedings of any legislature of any state other than the Republicof Ireland.
 5. A fair and accurate report of proceedings in public of any body duly
 appointed, in the State, on the authority of a Minister of the 
Government, the Government, the Oireachtas, either House of the 
Oireachtas or a court established by law in the State to conduct a 
public inquiry on a matter of public importance.
 6. A fair and accurate report of proceedings in public of any body duly
 appointed, in Northern Ireland, on the authority of a person or body 
corresponding to a person or body referred to in paragraph 5 to conduct a
 public inquiry on a matter of public importance.
 7. A fair and accurate report of any proceedings in public of any body—
 (a) that is part of any legislature of any state other than the 
Republic of Ireland, or (b) duly appointed in a state other than the 
State, on the authority of a person or body corresponding to a person or
 body referred to in paragraph 5, to conduct a public inquiry on a 
matter of public importance.
 8. A fair and accurate report of any proceedings in public of an 
international organisation of which the State or Government is a member 
or the proceedings of which are of interest to the State.
 9. A fair and accurate report of any proceedings in public of any 
international conference to which the Government sends a representative 
or observer or at which governments of states (other than the State) are
 represented.
 10. A fair and accurate copy or extract from any register kept in 
pursuance of any law which is open to inspection by the public or of any
 other document which is required by law to be open to inspection by the
 public.
 11. A fair and accurate report, copy or summary of any notice or 
advertisement published by or on the authority of any court established 
by law in the State or under the law of a Member State of the European 
Union, or any judge or officer of such a court.
 12. A fair and accurate report or copy or summary of any notice or 
other document issued for the information of the public by or on behalf 
of any Department of State for which a Minister of the Government is 
responsible, local authority or the Garda Commissioner, or by or on 
behalf of a corresponding department, authority or officer in a Member 
State of the European Union.
 13. A fair and accurate report or copy or summary of any notice or 
document issued by or on the authority of a committee appointed by 
either House of the Oireachtas or jointly by both Houses of the 
Oireachtas.
 14. A determination of the Press Ombudsman (from April 23, 2010).
 15. A determination or report of the Press Council (from April 23, 2010).
 16. Any statement published pursuant to, and in accordance with, a 
determination of the Press Ombudsman or the Press Council (from April 
23, 2010).
 17. Any statement made during the investigation or hearing of a 
complaint by the Press Ombudsman in accordance with Schedule 2 (from 
April 23, 2010).
 18. Any statement made during the hearing of an appeal from a 
determination of the Press Ombudsman in accordance with Schedule 2 (from
 April 23, 2010).
 19. Any statement published by a person in accordance with a 
requirement under an Act of the Oireachtas whether or not that person is
 the author of the statement. 
 Schedule 1 Part 2 - Statements privileged subject to explanation or contradiction
1. A fair and accurate report of the proceedings, 
findings or decisions of an association, or a committee or governing 
body of an association relating to a member of the association or to a 
person subject to control by the association. 
 2. A fair and accurate report of the proceedings at any
 lawful public meeting in the state or in the EU held to discuss any 
matter of public concern, whether admission is general or restricted. 
 3. A fair and accurate report of the proceedings at a general 
meeting, whether in the State or in an EU member state, of any company 
or association established by or under statute or incorporated by 
charter. 
 4. A fair and accurate report of the proceedings at any meeting
 or sitting of any local authority or the Health Service Executive, and 
any corresponding body in an EU member state. 
 5. A fair and accurate report of a press conference convened by
 or on behalf of a body to which this part applies or the organisers of a
 public meeting within the meaning of paragraph 2 to give an account to 
the public of the proceedings or meeting. 
 6. A fair and accurate report of a report to which the defence of qualified privilege would apply. 
 7. A copy or fair and accurate report or summary of any ruling,
 direction, report, investigation, statement or notice of the Irish 
Takeover Panel.